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Surnrnsry
The research takes stock of the legal standard for the connection of several national .'V
police computer networks. Moreover, the cross-border use of (multimedia) databases i }
over an international police Intranet is investigated. *i»
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The research consists of three parts. ;„ .=J:S • !. '^  ,. ,; - •••., - . : , • . ,, , . /
Firstly, an inventory has been made of (1) the relevant legal frameworks, (2) the legal
bottlenecks that may arise out of these frameworks, and (3) the organisational implica-
tions in The Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. , ••> -. •! (-*'•«. .. ..-v • - . ' . . ' ' , .,.,-:'.:
Secondly, an adequate proposal for a legal framework has been developed to support a
reliable connection of national Intranets, which guarantees the privacy.
Finally, an inventory has been made of the technical achievements of the computer envi-
ronment PALMA/EMMI. . , , , . , ..^  , ., -.,.,..,„„., ...,. . . - , - —„.-,,»,-.- ..»,*.„
The main research question is supplemented with three additional reseach questions.
These questions fall fully within the scope of the main research question. They deal how-
ever with three specific subjects of the main research question. It entails the following
three research questions. ,
1- "In what way are soft police data legally protected in the Dutch, Belgian, and German
legal order, and how should they be treated within the framework of the police infor-
mation exchange in the border areas?" (The question is answered in Chapter 5 and in
particular subsection 5.6.3 of the study).
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2. "Which legal choice should the Council of Europe and the European Union make
with respect to the problem of direct automated cross-border access of foreign law-
enforcement officers to national (police) databases and computer networks, seen in
the light of the international legal developments on digital expertise?" (The question
is answered in Chapter 7 of the study).
3. "Which are the legal boundaries between the activities of Europol and the activities of
the IRCs?" (The question is answered in Chapter 8 of the study).
The increasing need for international exchange of police data within the European bor-
der regions has been a great stimulus for this study. In particular, the opening of the • •
European inner borders since 1992 and the rise in cross-border crime rates resulting
from it have encouraged the international exchange of information by computer com-
munication.
In order to realise a quick and effective information exchange several international con-
tact points were established along the various borders of The Netherlands, Belgium, and
Germany. These contact points are called International Legal Assistance Centres (in
Dutch: Internationale Rechtshulp Centra, IRCs).
In the Eurcgion Aachen-Liege-Maastricht, two major projects were conducted in the
years 1995 to 1998: PALMA and EMMI (PALMA stands for Police connections Aachen
Liege MAastricht and EMMI stands for Euregional MultiMedia Information exchange).
These projects and their positive results have led to the present study.
After PALMA and EMMI, i.e. around 2000, the state of affairs was the existence of an
EMMI environment in which an automated and secured exchange of police data could
take place. The essence was an international, closed police Intranet, which operated sep-
arately from other networks. The computer network is closed because only authorised
police officials have access to it. The network is (obviously) separate because a direct con-
nection with other national networks may not be realised for political and legal reasons.
The present study deals in particular with the question how a connection of the EMMI
environment with the national police networks of The Netherlands, Belgium, and Ger-
many should be arranged in order to comply with the national and international legal
requirements. The EMMI environment has been designed to work within the framework
of the Schengen legislation, the result of which is examined in our study. Moreover, we
focus on the compatibility of the environment with the national legislations and regula-
tions of The Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. '» - '<=•:• n- s-.J i;. ..>:a-> -.. „:•
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SUMMARY
Within the EMMI environment a distinction has been made between two types of com-
munication: (1) direct multimedia communication and (2) communication via a multi-
media kiosk.
1. Multimedia communication takes place between two (or more) identities (person O* •
authority). For this type of communication the so-called PALMA Software is used. •-M
Personal data arc exchanged between the national and foreign IRCs via template- b
based and secured e-mail facilities. Ail exchanges are registered in so-called registrar,»
tion databases and a central logdatabase. Furthermore, video conferencing and file-
transfer facilities are provided. O
2. The multimedia kiosk contains all kinds of information which is not personal data« v»
which may be exchanged between the national and foreign IRCs via electronic publi-
cation by means of browser software. In the future this browser software could be
used to establish a connection with all the available databases within the national •
police networks. Whether this is possible depends mainly on the legal requirement»*'
for such a connection. M»-:t'" *t?».vj?-*ji'j*'v- „.ft »*. «h-.>••- .*•< r
In the thesis the following approach has been followed after the introduction in Chapter 1.
Chapter 2 describes how data are exchanged in the police practice in the border regions
at this moment. Among other things, the organisations and agencies involved are dis-
cussed. In Chapter 3 the PALMA concept is described and in Chapter 4 the EMMI con-
cept.
After the description of the usual practice, Chapter 5 investigates how the mutual legal
assistence in criminal affairs in The Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany is regulated. A
distinction is made between judicial and police legal assistence. The last type of legal
assistence is examined in detail. The international legislation on the exchange of police
data and the various national legislations and instructions of The Netherlands, Belgium,
and Germany are discussed. We also describe the way soft data should be handled within
the framework of the police information exchange in the border areas. Soft data are non-
conclusive and non-established data, which may not yet be used for evidentiary pur-
poses.
Chapter 6 describes the connection of data as seen from two essentially distinct angles: a
technical one and a legal one. It appears that the legislator merely has envisaged the sim-
ple connection of databases via computer matching or computer profiling. However,
modern techniques give rise to several other ways of tracking down relevant information.
Legally speaking many obstacles concerning connection still have to be incorporated
into regulations. The chapter formulates multiple proposals with respect to this issue.
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Chapter 7 leads us into the domain of digital expertise of the police conducting criminal
investigation throughout the physical borders of countries and the virtual borders of
cyberspace. We discuss the Cybercrime Convention from 2001 and the EU Agreement
on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters from 2000. This adjacent research domain
learns us about the necessity (or at least the wish of certain European police services) to
draft adequate legislation for the central problem of the direct cross-border access of for-
eign police officers to national computer networks, files, and databases.
Chapter 8 deals with the legal boundaries between the activities of Europo! and the
activities of the IRQ. .
In Chapter 9 conclusions are formulated through a synthesis of the existing practice and
the legal standard. We consider especially what is legally desirable as well as technically
realisable. The focus is on an adequate legal framework for a reliable connection of the
national police computer networks of The Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. The
main issue is guaranteeing the citizen's privacy.
The main results of our study are summarised below.
- For the international exchange of police data, in particular the following Articles have
to be taken into account: the Articles 39, 46, and 126-130 SUO, the Article 552; Sv,
and the Articles 13 and 17 BPolr.
- The international law allows connection of police data provided that a legal basis in
the national law exists or that the national data protection authorities have given their
consent. In The Netherlands a legal basis for the connection of police data is incorpo-
rated in domestic law. In Belgium and Germany such clear connection rules still have
to be incorporated in the privacy legislation.
- The connection of data, as legally envisaged so far, is not the main legal bottleneck for
the informative police co-operation in the border areas. In addition to simple connec-
tions of data the legislator should focus on other existing connection techniques such
as data mining. • • • • . . . . ? • . . , . ; . . . . ; ; * < ! . • : - n - - ,. » i •„
- A predominant legal problem is direct automated access to police registers, which is
prohibited for foreign police officials as well as for the national Public Prosecution.
The latter group has the duty to control the exchange of police data and the 1RP reg-
ister (the registration database) under the Article 552/ Sv. • i»^ ,» • ;r:; .^^' -
- At this moment, mutual cross-border queries of (multimedia) databases in national
police networks are only possible through human intervention. Then the control is in
compliance with the national and international legislation. To achieve a connection
without human intervention, f.£., only with human inspection afterwards, the
national (and preferably also international) legislation has to be revised. Until then
human intervention and human control by the members of the IRCs remain strict
334
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legal demands for the international exchange of police data. It should be stressed that
these strict legal demands do not fully apply with respect to direct automated access
to registers that fall under common privacy regulations. -j»i" *.•<»• ™-
EMMI fulfils the needs of an effective informative police co-operation. The
men ted automated information exchange has the following benefits;
- easier access to cross-border information; f > -•**• •»«» 'H«:*IM*H*V<J •>*» -, > S.«-,M
- standardised information exchange; a : • - ;. •. iv< •) »4 .**»/• to t^u»» ni .;• '
- faster exchange of diverse (multimedia) informations • ~?*nv > <•• ANi <•* *t IV • J
- automated registration with management facilities;
- maintaining, formalising, and controlling informal contacts; and •^ m-'jwvVfe*! 1
* a better understanding of cultural and organisational differences, •«•wt ;4J,.*>••>! S
The implicit Dutch prohibition of direct automated cross-border access of foreign
law-enforcement officers to national police registers, databases, and police networks,
as well as the Belgian and German policy in this respect, make a physical link ol the
EMMI environment with the national police computer networks involved impossible
for the moment. - •'• • > • ; ; > - . ••••••, .-.•• s * ^ ) »
There are four possible ways towards an adequate regulation of the problem of direct
access: via (a) the Council of Europe, (b) the European Union, (c) covenant!, and
agreements in the border areas, and (d) regulation in the national legislation of ehe
s t a t e s i n v o l v e d , h s r : . j . S ' « f > » i . ? i ) * 8 * j S ' .••/ * . r ! = > •-!,' , • ) • ) ' • < • ; ; . • • < • , ' ' s . l . • . » ; , ' • ,
Only in the Dutch legal order soft data have a definite legal protection regime within
Article 5a and § 3a WPolr (Police registers Act). The storage terms of soft data are
only competently regulated within The Netherlands.
Soft, non-conclusive and non-established data require supervision of the Public Pros-
ecutor before they are internationally exchanged with police services in the border
areas. For the moment, such supervision is only properly regulated in Dutch legisla-
tion; not in Belgian and German legislation.
The activities of the IRCs provide a new 'co-operation market' for the information
exchange in the border regions of the European Union. This entails the need for a
swift cross-border information exchange for the 'ordinary' police work, being main-
taining order, traffic control, and the so-called smaller crime. The international infor-
mation exchange network EMMI is at present being used for this purpose by twenty
police forces in the border regions of four countries: The Netherlands, Belgium, Ger-
many, and France. The international police data exchange in the border regions takes
place within the legal boundaries of international legislation and covenants, which
allow under certain conditions and legal safeguards the direct exchange of data
between the IRCs of the states involved.
Europol is a European body for the refinement and exchange of data, which may con-
tribute to preventing and fighting certain forms of cross-border organised crime. The
information exchange takes place on a central national level via national units and
Europol Liaison Officers (ELOs). Europol is competent to support certain law-
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enforcement activities, which are laid down in the Europol mandate, if there exists an
organised criminal structure and two or more EU member states are involved.
On the basis of the international legal principle that the registrations of the IRCs may
not constitute a new independent source of information, the data, which are stored
on the local registration databases and the central log database of PALMA, may not be
used for the refinement or the exchange of data via Europol. • - •"• •*«
On the basis of Article 6 section 2 of the Europol Convention, a link between the
EMMI/PALMA environment and Europol is not allowed. • , J.,,-.,..
The study formulates twenty-nine implicit recommendations for both the national and
international legislators with respect to the international informative police co-operation
between the border areas of The Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. We also give one
specific recommendation with respect to the establishment of an EMMI management
organisation. The following fourteen implicit recommendations are the most important
one». • ' - « • • - • ; • • • • : r . v . .; • , - • . • • . . '
- The rrff/onrf/r behind the existing regulation of direct automated access to police regis-
ters has to be reconsidered.
- Legal solutions for direct automated access and for legal connection have to be dealt
with by: (I) the Council of Europe, (2) the European Union, and (3) the national leg-
islator. The latter has to adapt Article 17, paragraph 1 BPolr. . .•;;--*:»< -.:< -
- According to Article 6, paragraph 2 WPolr the IRP regulations should control the
connection of data when taken from the IRP register and any other register.
- Article 8, paragraph 2 of the IRP regulations states that the data stored in the registra-
tion database must be removed after a period of ten years. To ensure this both techni-
cal and organisational measures have to be taken. « .--,• - r* :^
- The unofficial communication lines should also be registered within the EMMI envi-
ronment.
- The legislator has to take into account that the registration databases and the central
logdatabase have become an autonomous source of information. .^ ' «,. .>
- The legal notion of connection has to be adjusted in such a way that it complies with
the existing modern connection techniques.
- When creating standards for a reliable connection, the legislator should obey the
common principles of appropriate ICT use. \ i- • ;-,:-i-: •"•: .-«-•>' o.vrst-i '••«*. •
- We strongly recommend the constitution of unambiguous legal norms and transpar-
ent formal procedures with respect to the core legal problem of direct automated
access to data, files, and computer systems. Preferably, this task should be executed on
the level of the Council of Europe and the European Union. National legislation
could then be employed to regulate the set of norms in greater detail. The Cybercrime
Treaty of 2001 and the EU Agreement on mutual assistance in criminal matters of
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2000 may be a source of inspiration in order to come to internationally acceptable
solutions for this legal problem.
The legislators of the countries involved in the international exchange of police data
need to express formally whether members of the Public Prosecutor and foreign police
officers should have direct automated access to certain police registers. If direct auto-
mated access is given, the legal and technological preconditions need to be deter-
mined too.
The present bilateral treaties and covenants, which are in force between The Nether-
lands, Belgium, and Germany, do neither contain a regulation on the direct auto-
mated access by a foreign police officer, nor do they contain anything on the linking
of data, files or computer systems. Hence, the parties involved in the international
police data exchange need to reach an agreement on these points, preferably by means
of a bilateral or trilateral treaty or covenant. Perhaps, in such a treaty or covenant
agreements could be made whether, from a legal point of view, the linking of
exchanged (personal) data should be possible, and if so, to what extent. In such a
treaty or covenant respect for the finality principle will continue to play a crucial part.
One might consider that the use of a treaty to achieve the aforementioned purposes is
rather severe, since a treaty should only be used if all other means fail.
Within the covenants and agreements in the border areas between The Netherlands,
Belgium, and Germany, on the basis of Article 39 sections 4 and 5 and Article 46 sec-
tion 2 of the Schengen Executive Agreement, more tuning should take place between
the completely different national legislation with respect to soft data.
Belgium and Germany should constitute an adequate legal framework for handling
soft data (including the storage terms) and the (international) exchange of soft data.
The European Council and the Council of Ministers of the European Union should
stimulate that Europol and the IRCs are informed about each others activities, the
common grounds of their activities, and the legal boundaries between both bodies.
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